## DOD TRADEOFF DA

### U---AT Ukraine Thumper

#### Pivot to Asia is strong, despite Ukraine

Craig 6-20-2022, PhD, Vice President (Engagement) at Yale-NUS College (Trisha, “Commentary: The US ‘pivot to Asia’ is back, but will it be enough?: Despite war in Ukraine and domestic political problems, US President Joe Biden’s administration has refreshed the “pivot to Asia” to build relationships and push back against China, says Yale-NUS College's Trisha Craig,” *Channel News Asia*, <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/us-china-pivot-asia-indo-pacific-trade-security-2755641>)

With the situation in Ukraine, there were fears that an international crisis elsewhere in the world would once again push Asia off America’s agenda. The Iran nuclear deal under Obama or the withdrawal from Afghanistan early in Biden’s presidency seemed to draw attention away. However, the Ukraine war seems to have strengthened the administration’s resolve and alliance building. Biden’s careful outreach to re-engage traditional allies early in his presidency allowed him to effectively build a coalition of European and Asian partners to isolate Russia after its invasion. The show of unity and speedy coordination may change security calculations in the Indo-Pacific. Security issues were part of the backdrop to Biden’s first trip to Asia, especially given the parallels between Taiwan and Ukraine that many have drawn. The trip reinforced a renewed sense of US engagement, after previous trips to the region by Vice President Kamala Harris, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defence Secretary Austin. Biden’s meetings both with the leaders of South Korea and Japan and the Quad were meant to reassure allies of US commitment, but also produced concrete outcomes like Japan’s plan to raise defence spending substantially. On the heels of Biden’s trip, Austin met his Chinese counterpart, Wei Fenghe, in person for the first time at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. While Austin pushed back against China’s “more coercive and aggressive approach to its territorial claims” when addressing the conference, he also highlighted the importance of security alliances and partnerships in the region, such as AUKUS with Australia and the United Kingdom. WHY PIVOT TO ASIA IS STILL THE RIGHT STRATEGY FOR US Asia will remain the central focus for the US – it has no choice if it wants to share in the region’s economic growth and tap on regional partners to counter China. In the important areas of trade and security, the US position has seemed inconsistent or mercurial in recent years. The Biden administration’s current focus on policies like IPEF, and careful cultivation of traditional regional partners may seem like a watered-down version of the much vaunted pivot. But after the administration changes, any clarity on the US stance, particularly on trade, is welcome. A return to multilateralism certainly is. Ideally, the US would offer more concrete and far-reaching policies, to show up as a more attractive partner than China and reassure the region of its long-term commitment. But as veteran diplomats have said, the United States is a necessary part of the strategic balance in Asia regardless. Biden’s version of the pivot may lay the foundations for sustainable, productive, and cooperative engagement with the region.

#### Prefer recent evidence.

Craig 6-20-2022, PhD, Vice President (Engagement) at Yale-NUS College (Trisha, “Commentary: The US ‘pivot to Asia’ is back, but will it be enough?: Despite war in Ukraine and domestic political problems, US President Joe Biden’s administration has refreshed the “pivot to Asia” to build relationships and push back against China, says Yale-NUS College's Trisha Craig,” *Channel News Asia*, <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/us-china-pivot-asia-indo-pacific-trade-security-2755641>)//BB

The United States “pivot to Asia” is back. The shift in US foreign, economic and security policy to Asia has been re-energised over the past month, after being sidelined by both domestic politics and foreign crises since it began about a decade ago under the Obama administration. US President Joe Biden hosted leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Washington for a two-day summit, which last took place in 2016. It ended with an agreement to upgrade US-ASEAN ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership and a nominee for US ambassador to ASEAN, a post vacant since 2017. This was quickly followed by Biden’s inaugural trip to Asia, with visits to South Korea and Japan, including a Tokyo summit of the Quad, the informal alliance of the US, Japan, Australia and India. More recently, US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin addressed the Shangri-La Dialogue, the annual Asian security conference in Singapore that concluded on Jun 12, reaffirming that the Indo-Pacific is “our centre of strategic gravity”. This focus by the Biden administration comes at a time of war in Ukraine and domestic political problems. It is meant to reassure the region that the US isn’t too busy in Europe or distracted at home to prioritise relationships with Asia and push back against China.

#### Their conventional wisdom about Ukraine trading off is wrong

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The war in Ukraine, and Allied efforts to assist Ukraine and to bolster deterrence in the East, seem to have led to a revival of the transatlantic relationship, and a renewed focus on Europe, including for the United States. Yet contrary to what one may instinctively think, the war in Ukraine is unlikely to alter the steady shift in the centre of global strategy and politics – or, for that matter, of US geostrategy – towards the Indo-Pacific region. Rather than halt a shift towards the Indo-Pacific, the Ukraine crisis and the response to it so far, provide a powerful illustration of how European geopolitical and security dynamics are increasingly affected by extra-European ones.

### L---OCOs

#### Tremendous start up costs ensure a trade-off

Blessing 2021

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There are, however, several dynamics that reveal the limits of the fail-deadly and fail-safe logics underlying NATO’s collective defense initiatives. In short, these strategic logics only apply to a narrow set of threats; they will not apply to the full spectrum of threats presented by the cyber domain. Fail-deadly deterrence is only likely to succeed in preventing state-level adversaries from undertaking resource-intensive cyber operations that reach the threshold of armed conflict with physical, destructive effects and that are quickly attributable.38 Fail-safe defensive measures also face several political and technical challenges, all of which point to a role for cyber resilience.

Three main complications limit the applicability of the fail-deadly logics underpinning collective defense efforts in cyberspace. The first is deciding which actors are to be deterred. Compared to traditional warfighting domains, there are relatively low entry costs for conducting operations in the cyber domain.39 As such, both state and non-state actors can target the Alliance. There are also asymmetric operational costs—actors are faced with multiple avenues for potential gains and few risks. This means that it will be near-impossible to change the decision calculus of a malicious actor deploying low-cost, low-risk techniques such as distributed denials of service. Conversely, sophisticated cyber operations that can produce strategic effects equivalent to those of conventional military attacks will have both significant and costly intelligence requirements that can only be borne by state actors. These higher ‘start-up’ costs mean it may be possible to change the decision calculus of actors seeking to conduct highly sophisticated cyber operations. Due to this asymmetry, only state actors undertaking costly cyber operations are likely to be deterred. In all other circumstances, deterrence will be more prone to failure.40

#### Enhanced shared OCOs drain military resources

Herr and Schneider 18, visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, \*\* an assistant professor and affiliate faculty at the Center for Cyber Conflict Studies at the U.S. Naval War College (Trey and Jacquelyn, “Sharing is Caring: The United States’ New Cyber Commitment for NATO,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/sharing-caring-united-states-new-cyber-commitment-nato)//BB>

The Pentagon’s new commitment also reflects changes in how Europe talks about cybersecurity and characterizes the Russian threat. The last two years have seen a trend toward more open discussion of offensive cyber operations and the possibility of the alliance adopting more assertive postures to counter cyber operations against its members. After years of devastating ransomware attacks and cyber-enabled information attacks, NATO members are more willing to explore cyber triggers to Article 5. They have also been more willing to articulate the cyber threat against the alliance. In addition to last week’s denunciation by Dutch, UK, and U.S. authorities, Russian state actors are widely suggested to be responsible for an increasingly brazen series of operations, including targeting German government ministries, French and British TV stations, and more.

Sharing offensive cyber capabilities raises the question of whether cyber operations can extend effective deterrence to NATO partners. There seems to be little focus on using these operations to deter conventional or nuclear attacks on NATO countries, but this may evolve. The United States seems to want NATO to use cyber operations to deter other cyber operations, particularly those falling under the threshold of armed conflict. Cyber operations have all sorts of problems for deterrence: signaling is difficult, they can be perceived as a cheap threat, and their effects are largely uncertain. By contrast, moving new military forces in Eastern Europe or conducting ground exercises are credible signals of extended deterrence, but are costly and time consuming. Cyber capabilities aren’t free, nor are they necessarily cheap, but the promise to use them can add new credibility to a deterrent threat without the same investment and delay as conventional alternatives. Sharing cyber capabilities may be a cheaper way to signal alliance commitment than other options and might signal a further maturation, and acceptance, of cybersecurity into geopolitics.

### !---Turns Case

#### Asian war decks US commitments to NATO

Binnenkijk and Townsend 2021

Hans Binnenkijk, distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, former senior official at US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, National Security Council, State Department, and the National Defense University; Jim Townsend Jr. adjunct senior fellow in the CNAS Transatlantic Security Program, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for European and NATO Policy. "The Future US Role in NATO," NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond, (131-156), 2021.

The United States' relationship with the Alliance a decade from now will depend upon at least four variables. First, will the return to solid US support for the Alliance seen during President Biden's Summit meetings in June 2021 be sustained for the next decade, or will US populism grow and return the nation to some form of America First? The outcome is uncertain, but the resurrection of a populist United States cannot be ruled out; Europe needs to begin planning for this contingency. Second, will the military threats to the United States and its NATO Allies continue to expand? Major power threats from Russia and China appear to be on the rise, with both nations increasing their defense cooperation. North Korea and Iran appear to pose increasing nuclear proliferation risks and are drawing closer to both of these two major power adversaries. The threat of extremism from the Middle East is also likely to continue. America risks being overextended in dealing with these multiple challenges. This dynamic will require that America's global alliances thrive. But since the military challenge in Asia is greatest, the United States might again be forced to pivot much of its attention to Asia. Third, the scope of the non-military or unconventional challenges facing NATO will probably also continue to expand. These challenges include cyberattacks, disinformation, other forms of unconventional warfare, coercive diplomacy, global warming, and public health issues. To remain relevant, the scope of NATO's missions will need to continue to expand to address these non-military challenges. And fourth, with the above three factors in play, the final variable is: can European members of the Alliance increase their political cohesion and their defense contributions to meet their share of these growing challenges? The requirement is there but European willpower is also uncertain.

### AT: Deficit Spending

#### Normal means is not deficit spending---Ukraine.

Desiderio et al. 22 [Andrew Desiderio, Lara Seligman, Connor O’Brien; "Pentagon vs. Congress tension builds over monitoring billions in Ukraine aid"; POLITICO; Published: 6-2-2022; Accessed: 6-21-2022; https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/02/congress-pentagon-ukraine-aid-oversight-00036463; KL]

The Pentagon was already struggling to keep up with Congress’ demands for oversight of its spending. Then, lawmakers earmarked an extra $40 billion for Ukraine.

Concerns are mounting on Capitol Hill about the Biden administration’s ability to properly account for the unprecedented wave of cash and to track the thousands of U.S. weapons heading to Ukraine for its war with Russia. And given the Pentagon’s recent track record concerning congressional oversight, it’s coming under increased scrutiny from members of both parties — from progressive Elizabeth Warren to libertarian Rand Paul.

Some lawmakers are already warning the Biden administration that a future aid package could lose the overwhelming congressional support that has been a hallmark of the previous efforts. A key barometer will be the Pentagon’s handling and complete accounting of the funds, which has lagged in other areas, sparking scrutiny from congressional committees.

Sen. Warren (D-Mass.), a member of the Armed Services Committee, said in an email that a full accounting of the already-appropriated funding will be “critically important for both past and future funding requests.”

“The U.S. government is sending billions in humanitarian, economic, and military assistance to help the Ukrainian people overcome Putin’s brutal war, and the American people expect strong oversight by Congress and full accounting from the Department of Defense,” she added.

Pentagon spokesperson Marine Corps Lt. Col. Anton Semelroth said the department is “committed” to transparency with the public and with Congress about the security assistance funds. But he stressed that war involves risk, and called on Russia to end the conflict.

“Risk of diversion is one of many considerations that we routinely assess when evaluating any potential arms transfer,” Semelroth said. “In this case, risk would be considerably minimized by the full withdrawal from Ukraine by Russian forces.”

While all Democrats and most Republicans voted for the aid package in May, it’s unclear whether that coalition can stick together if President Joe Biden asks Congress for more money before the end of the fiscal year, as many on the Hill predict will be the case. The Pentagon already owes Congress a backlog of reports on its spending for European security, and progressives and conservatives alike have said they’ll be looking for more cooperation before approving another cash infusion.

Amid the Pentagon-Hill squabbling, Biden announced on Wednesday the first tranche of military assistance from the massive funding bill that cleared both chambers last month. And oversight concerns are at the forefront, as the newly announced $700 million package for the first time includes a more advanced, precision-guided rocket system that will allow Ukraine to strike targets even further away — potentially in Russia.

The Biden administration deliberated for weeks over whether to send the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, known as HIMARS, and medium or long-range munitions. Officials worried that providing longer-range rockets could provoke Russian President Vladimir Putin into escalating the conflict. They ultimately decided to send the shorter-range rockets, which can reach 48 miles, instead of the longer-range munitions, which can fly 190 miles.

Officials worry about the department’s ability to keep track of all the weapons the U.S. is providing, including the HIMARS, as well as ensuring they are being used effectively. Kyiv has given Washington “assurances” that it will only use the rockets on the battlefield in Ukraine, and not to strike targets in Russia, senior administration officials said. But they did not detail those assurances, and there is concern that the Pentagon has no way to monitor the use of the weapons.

Semelroth said the department is “confident in the Ukrainian government’s ability to appropriately safeguard and account for transferred U.S.-origin defense equipment,” noting that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has underscored the importance of “accountability” to his Ukrainian counterpart, Oleksii Reznikov.

“Ukrainian leadership have assured us that they understand the importance of accountability, and we are committed to working with them to further enhance accountability in the future,” Semelroth said.

A senior congressional official familiar with the oversight process described it as “quite robust” and said the administration has been briefing Hill committees regularly.

“In most cases, it’s munitions going out of our stocks and into the hands of Ukraine. One Howitzer out for us, one in for them,” the official said, granted anonymity to speak about sensitive briefings.

The $40 billion legislation includes several measures aimed at beefing up oversight of the cash. It requires the Pentagon inspector general’s office to review how the Defense Department spends the emergency funding. It also requires the Pentagon, in coordination with the State Department, to report to Congress on how weapons and equipment sent to Ukraine are being accounted for.

Rep. Ruben Gallego (D-Ariz.), a member of the Armed Services Committee, acknowledged that U.S. weapons sent to war zones have often gone missing or unused, but said “Ukraine is a different story” because its forces are well-trained and have been using the weapons for several years already.

“Obviously, we always have to be on the lookout, but this is not the same scenario that we have in the past,” Gallego said. “There have been agreements between our governments about [some of the weapons’] usage. And I believe so far Ukraine has abided by all of them.”

The Biden administration is using several metrics to determine how best to allocate the money, including the selection of systems that will help beat back Russia, but not fuel a wider conflict. Another consideration is not sending Ukrainians cutting-edge technology, given U.S. concerns the weapons could fall into Russian hands. If that happened, the Russians could reverse-engineer those systems and create new weapons for its military, according to an official with knowledge of the discussions who was not authorized to speak on the record.

“We in the administration have to very prudently measure those risks … and to think very carefully about how can we best … give the Ukrainian military what they need,” Army Secretary Christine Wormuth told the Atlantic Council on Tuesday.

The White House is hoping the latest emergency funding measure is enough to sustain Ukraine through the next several months of the conflict, but Congress is already bracing for the next cash fight.

At a confirmation hearing last week, Gen. Christopher Cavoli, Biden’s nominee to lead U.S. European Command, indicated that he believed that Americans are owed “a thoughtful application of those funds and a full accounting of them.”

That’s going to be a heavy lift for the Pentagon, which already owes the Senate Armed Services Committee “several years” worth of reports, according to Warren. That includes billions of dollars already allocated for the European Deterrence Initiative, a program aimed at bolstering U.S. presence on the continent following Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea. Warren said she was “getting sick of the run-around here” and said the Pentagon “has not complied with the law.”

In a recent letter to the Pentagon’s finance chief obtained by POLITICO, Warren wrote that “tracking this spending is a key part of how we protect American interests and support of our allies.”

Although every Democrat in both the Senate and House voted for the $40 billion aid package last month, several progressives were reluctant to support it given their existing concerns about a bloated Pentagon, as well as their general opposition to flooding a war zone with new weapons. Congressional leaders significantly boosted the humanitarian assistance portion, mollifying lawmakers who had considered voting against the bill.

Sen. Paul (R-Ky.), who held up the $40 billion aid package amid his demands that Congress tap a special inspector general to monitor the spending of the Ukraine funds, has raised similar concerns.

A fiscal hawk, Paul joined 10 other GOP senators and 57 House Republicans in voting against the aid bill, with several arguing that there wasn’t stringent enough oversight of the money. Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) argued the money “comes [with] no meaningful oversight.”

The latest round of emergency funding dwarfs an earlier $14 billion package enacted by Congress in March and supersizes several programs to aid Ukraine’s military, including $6 billion for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, a Pentagon program that helps arm the Ukrainian military. In a government-wide funding deal passed in March, by contrast, lawmakers allocated $300 million for the account.

The package also raises the total authority to ship weapons to Ukraine from U.S. military inventories to $11 billion. Additionally, the Pentagon was granted nearly $9 billion in new funding to replace weapons that have been sent into the fight.